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I. THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THAT THE TRUST DID NOT FULLY 
PERFORM. THEREFORE. THE TRUST IS NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE UNDER UTAH LAW. THE TRUST HAS MISSTATED 
THE LAW TO THE CONTRARY. 
A. The Trust Does Not Address The Controlling Legal Standards Regarding 
Specific Performance. 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy that requires the aggrieved party to make 
an unconditional tender of the performance required by the agreement. Kelley v. 
Leucadia Financial Corp.. 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). Thus, 
performance requires "a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of 
money due, coupled with an actual production of the money or its equivalent." Carry. 
Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to its assertions in its Brief, it is the Trust's obligation to prove that it 
tendered full performance. Lincoln Land and Development Co. v. Thompson. 489 P.2d 426, 
428 (Utah 1971). Indeed, the Trial Court expressly said so. Addendum, Ex. C, Conclusions 
of Law, Tf 11, R. 2506 ("it is plaintiffs obligation under the remand order to prove the 
value of the stock reached $85,000 and the Court has found and concluded plaintiff did 
not prove that value and so there was a failure of a condition of the contract") (emphasis 
added). Nagle is not required to prove that the Trust did not perform. 
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B. Substantial Performance Does Not Entitle a Party to a Decree For Specific 
Performance. 
In its Brief, the Trust, at long last, admits that it did not perform under the Contract. 
Trust Brief at p. 11. Instead, it argues for the first time that it is entitled to specific 
performance because it substantially performed under the Contract. Because this argument 
was not raised before the Trial Court and the Trust offers no other basis for considering it, 
this Court should decline to hear it. Harline v. Barken 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993) 
(Party that obtained summary judgment from trial court could not raise argument supporting 
affirmance that was not raised before the trial court). 
More importantly, the Trust misstates Utah law. The cases that the Trust cites do not 
support its position and in fact support Nagle's position. For example, in Christensen v. 
Christensen. 339 P.2d 101, 103-04 (Utah 1959), this Court held that a decree for specific 
performance would be appropriate because the buyers offered to and were prepared to 
complete performance but Seller refused to accept it ("the plaintiffs offered to pay the 
balance on numerous occasions, but. . . defendants have at all times declined to accept 
the same; . . . The court found that the plaintiffs were able, ready and willing to pay 
the balance of the purchase price") (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Woolsev v. Brown. 539 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah 1975), this Court held 
that plaintiff would be entitled to specific performance upon completion of performance 
under the contract ("Upon payment of the $49 balance plus the difference ($19.73) 
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between the refund by the mortgagee to the defendant and the cost of the insurance and 
1973 property taxes by plaintiffs, defendant is to deliver her conveyance") (emphasis 
added). The other cases cited by the Trust to support its argument make no reference to the 
proposition that substantial performance is sufficient to obtain a decree of specific 
performance. 
Indeed, the Trust appears to be using these cases as part of an effort to redefine what 
the measure of performance was to be in this case. However, the Appeals Court clearly 
stated that the measure of performance would be as follows: 
If, on remand, the fact finder determines that the 55,000 
shares were worth at least $85,000 at some point in time 
between September 18, 1979 and September 18, 1980, and 
that [Nagle] was obligated to sell the shares at that time, 
then [the Trust] has performed [its] obligations and [Nagle] 
is not entitled to further relief. However, if the fact finder 
determines that the shares did not reach a value of $85,000 
within the appointed period, then [Nagle] is entitled to offset 
the amount of the shortfall [the Trust] was obligated to pay 
in cash or additional shares against the value of the 
property. 
Addendum, Ex. B at % 27, R. 2428 (emphasis added); Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2417 (emphasis 
added). The Trust's argument that it made tender of performance incorrectly characterizes 
its performance obligation. Full performance is not measured by delivery of the shares but 
by whether they reach the agreed upon value. Cam 781 P.2d at 1294. Nor is the Trust's 
argument, raised here for the first time, that Nagle complicated and hindered Collard's 
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performance entitled to consideration because it depends entirely upon the Trial Court's 
flawed construction of the Contract. Performance was tied the value of the shares during the 
year period not to any action or inaction of Nagle. 
The Trust also argues that the Utah Statute of Frauds, U.C.A. § 25-5-8, "permits 
specific performance in the case of an oral contract, where a party has partially or 
substantially performed." Trust Brief at p. 17. This argument, too, was not presented to the 
Trial Court and is therefore not properly before this Court. More importantly, the Trust reads 
far too much into that provision. The part performance referred to in the Utah statute is that 
performance which removes an oral contract outside the purview of the Statute of Frauds. 
This Court has expressly held that to obtain a decree for specific performance in equity under 
an oral contract which has been removed from the Statute of Frauds, the party must complete 
performance. Young v. Moore, 663 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 1983) ("To achieve an equitable 
result the decree [for specific performance] should provide for complete performance 
of the settlement agreement by both parties") (emphasis added). 
C. The Trust Mischaracterizes The Trial Court's Ruling Regarding 
Performance. 
The Trust claims that the Trial Court "specifically found that Collard made an 
unconditional tender of performance required pursuant to the contract." Trust Brief at p. 18. 
The Trial Court made no such finding, as a review of the Trust's supporting citations 
indicates. To the contrary, as the Trust subsequently acknowledges, the Trial Court 
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specifically concluded as a matter of law that the Trust did indeed fail to perform. 
Addendum, Ex. C, Conclusions of Law, f 11, R. 2506 ("the Court has found and 
concluded plaintiff did not prove that value and so there was a failure of a condition of 
the contract") (emphasis added). 
II. THE TRUST DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE DEEP FLAWS IN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE REAL ESTATE 
PURCHASE CONTRACT. 
A. Nagle's Arguments Concerning Construction of The Contract Are Not 
Barred by The Statute of Limitations. 
Throughout its Brief, the Trust argues that Nagle's arguments concerning the Trial 
Court's improper construction of the Real Estate Purchase Contract are barred by the Statute 
of Limitations. This argument is contrary to the holding of the Appeals Court. Rather, the 
Appeals Court expressly held: 
[The Trust] argues that the statute of limitations prevents 
[Nagle] from asserting [the Trust's] failure to assume the 
mortgage and failure to pay the amount due under 
Addendum 2 as counterclaims. In this case, the Trial Court 
held [Nagle's] claims for breach of contract accrued no later 
than January 25, 1981. Nevertheless, even if [Nagle's] 
counterclaims are barred by the statute of limitations, 
[Nagle] is permitted to use these counterclaims as an offset 
or recoupment against [the Trust's] claims. 
Addendum, Ex. B at f 22, R. 2426 - 27 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is clear from the 
mandate from the Appeals Court that Nagle is entitled to raise matters of contract 
construction on appeal as part of his claim for recoupment and offset. Moreover, the Statute 
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of Limitations was not asserted by the Trust on remand of the case at the time Nagle was 
arguing contract construction points before the Trial Court. See, e.g.. R. 2619 at 375:16-25. 
Therefore, it cannot raise this point here,. Harline, 854 P.2d at 598. 
B. The Trust Ignores The Language of The Contract 
Like the Trial Court, the Trust ignores the plain language of the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. Yet, it is simply undeniable that the factors the Trial Court relied upon to fashion 
its remedy had the affect of rewriting the parties' agreement. 
Addendum 2 to the Contract states: 
Title of premises being sold under the contract referred to 
above will be transferred when Nagle Construction 
Company sells sufficient of the shares of Utah Coal & 
Chemical Corp. transferred under Addendum No, 1 [55,000 
shares] to realize $85,000 cash. Seller hereby agrees to sell 
shares sufficient to realize $85,000 within one year of receipt 
thereof providing the market value of said shares will cause 
a realization of $85.000. 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares conveyed not equal 
$85,000 within one year Buyer agrees to convey additional 
shares of Utah Coal & Chemical Corp. stock or cash 
sufficient to bring the total value conveyed to Seller to 
$85,000 before [Nagle] conveys title to premises sold to [the 
Trust]. 
Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2417 (emphasis added). 
The Contract does not require Nagle to make efforts to determine the value of the 
stock; it does not prohibit Nagle from speculating in the stock; it does not require Nagle to 
Reply Brief.wpd -6-
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prepare to sell the stock; it does not require Nagle to provide "a notice of deficiency" during 
the year period; it does not require Nagle to sell as many of the shares as he can during the 
year period and then seek the remainder from the Trust if there is a deficiency.1 Yet, the 
Trial Court fashioned a remedy based on Nagle's alleged failure to perform those enumerated 
functions. 
In reaching these conclusions, the Trial Court has imposed extra-contractual 
obligations on Nagle which substantially reconfigure the parties' obligations to each other. 
This is a function the Trial Court may not do even though it is sitting in equity. Warner v. 
Sirstms, 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1992) ("Although a court, sitting in equity, 
exercises discretion in granting or denying relief..., it does not have the authority to 
ignore existing principles of law in favor of its view of the equities") (emphasis added). 
One such principle of law the Trial Court ignored is that a court "will not make a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves . . . . Nor will [a court] 
avoid the contract's plain language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Bakowski v. Mtn. 
States SteeU Inc.. 52 P.3d 1179,1185 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see 
1
 For these same reasons, the Trust's argument that Nagle "complicated" the Trust's 
performance is without merit. Trust Brief at p. 17. As stated previously, the measure of 
performance under the Appeals Court mandate is whether the shares reached a value where 
Nagle could realize $85,000 from their sale. Nagle's action or inaction is irrelevant to this 
performance measure. 
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also Utah Transit Authority v. Salt Lake City Southern, P.3d , 2006 WL 346480 
(Utah App. 2006). 
The Contract also provides: 
In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by [the 
Trust], or upon the failure of [the Trust] to make any payment or 
payments when the same shall become due . . . [Nagle] shall 
have the right upon failure of [the Trust] to remedy the 
default within five days of written notice, to be released from 
all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, 
and all payments which have been made theretofore on this 
contract by [the Trust], [sic] shall be forfeited to [Nagle] as 
liquidated damages for the nonperformance of the contract, 
and [the Trust] agrees that [Nagle] may at his option reenter 
and take possession of said premises without legal processes 
as in its first and former estate, together with all 
improvements and additions made by [the Trust] thereon, 
and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become [sic] the property of [Nagle], [the Trust] 
becoming at once a tenant-at-will of [Nagle]. 
Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2415 (emphasis added). 
In relying on Collard's continuous occupation of the premises as justification for 
granting specific performance, both the Trial Court and the Trust ignore Nagle's express 
rights under Section 16 of the Contract to keep title and treat Collard as a tenant-at-will. 
Indeed, the Trial Court does not even mention that portion of the Contract, although Nagle 
raised the issue at trial. R. 2619 at 380: 16 - 381: 20. The Trial Court has simply penalized 
Nagle for exercising his rights under the Contract. This is not equitable, particularly since 
Reply Brief.wpd -8-
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the result of that penalty is that the Trust receives the benefit of the property even though 
Collard undeniably breached the Contract. 
C. The Trial Court Was Not Faithful to The Mandate of The Appeals Court 
on Remand. 
For purposes of this case on remand and now on appeal, the core of the Appeals Court 
decision is this: 
Allowing an offset or recoupment in circumstances where a 
defendant's affirmative claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations is based on a sound policy of preventing a plaintiff 
from waiting to assert a claim until after defendant's 
counterclaim is barred. See Couloru 915 P.2d at 1072. 
Allowing an offset is appropriate even though [the Trust] 
essentially seeks specific performance rather than money 
damages because equity requires it To the extent that 
[Nagle] sat on his rights and delayed asserting those rights, 
[the Trust] did the same. Moreover, although [Nagle] may 
have ultimately waived his claim, it is [the Trust] who 
initially breached the parties' original contract by never 
assuming the mortgage. To allow [the Trust] to breach one 
of [its] obligations under the contract then, years later -
after never having brought suit to have title conveyed - to 
obtain title without having to perform [its] other obligations 
under the same contract is not equitable. 
If, on remand, the fact finder determines that the 55,000 
shares were worth at least $85,000 at some point in time 
between September 18, 1979 and September 18, 1980, and 
that [Nagle] was obligated to sell the shares at that time, 
then [the Trust] has performed [its] obligations and [Nagle] 
is not entitled to further relief. However, if the fact finder 
determines that the shares did not reach a value of $85,000 
within the appointed period, then [Nagle] is entitled to offset 
the amount of the shortfall [the Trust] was obligated to pay 
Reply Brief.wpd -9-
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in cash or additional shares against the value of the 
property. 
Addendum, Ex. B at fl 26 and 27, R. 2427 - 28. 
The Trial Court strayed from this mandate. First, it granted specific performance to 
the Trust even as it acknowledged that the Trust had not fully performed its other obligations 
under the same contract. Indeed, the Trial Court concluded as a matter of fact and law that 
the shares of stock did not reach a value where they could realize $85,000 and therefore there 
was a failure of a condition of the contract. Addendum, Ex. C, Findings of Fact, f 12, 
R 2495, 2497, 2499, Conclusions of Law, f 11, R. 2506. 
The Appeals Court staked out the parameters of equity that were supposed to have 
guided the Trial Court, i.e., it would not be equitable to allow the Trust to keep title to the 
property if did not fully perform its contractual obligations. Yet, the Trial Court substituted 
its own concept of the equities over that of the Appeals Court. This violates the mandate rule 
of the law of the case doctrine. Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 594 (Utah 1948) (The legal 
pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case 
and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case). This substitution also violates 
well settled principles of Utah equity jurisprudence. Warner v. Sirstins. 838 P.2d at 670 
("Although a court, sitting in equity, exercises discretion in granting or denying relief 
. . . , it does not have the authority to ignore existing principles of law in favor of its 
view of the equities") (emphasis added). 
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The Trial Court also violated the mandate of the Appeals Court by revisiting the issue 
of the number of shares that were part of the transaction. The legal issue to be decided as 
framed by the Appeals Court was whether the 55,000 shares conveyed to Nagle ever reached 
a value where Nagle could realize $85,000 from their sale. Addendum, Ex. B at j^ 27, 
R 2428. The Trial Court was not authorized to revisit that issue and make factual and legal 
determinations on evidence that was already in the record. 
The Trust's efforts to remedy the Trial Court's errors are unavailing. First, it does not 
accurately recount what the Appeals Court said regarding specific performance. 
NOWHERE did the Appeals Court say that the Trial Court could award specific 
performance "if the trial court found that the Trust did not fully perform, by awarding the 
Trust specific performance and requiring the Trust to pay an offset." Trust Brief at p. 21. 
Nor would the Appeals Court have said that because that is not the law in Utah. Instead, the 
Appeals Court focused on whether the Trust had performed because the law in Utah is that 
a party must fully perform in order to obtain a decree for specific performance. See, e.g.. 
Kelley. 846 P.2d at 1243 ("Specific performance is an equitable remedy that requires the 
aggrieved party to make an unconditional tender of the performance required by the 
agreement") (emphasis added); Young. 663 P.2d at 81 (complete performance is required 
for specific performance); Cam 781 P.2d at 1294. 
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The Appeals Court also held that it would not be equitable for the Trust to keep the 
property if it had not folly performed. Addendum, Ex. B at f 26, R. 2427 - 28 ("To allow 
[the Trust] to breach one of [its] obligations under the contract, then, years later—after 
never having brought suit to have title conveyed—to obtain title without having to 
perform [its] other obligations under the same contract, is not equitable") (emphasis 
added). The Trust's reliance on Woolsey. 539 P.2d at 1038-39 is inapt. There, this Court 
required plaintiff to pay the remaining amounts owed on the mortgage- that is, to complete 
performance—before awarding a decree for specific performance. The Trial Court was not 
faithful to the mandate of the Appeals Court. 
D. The Trial Court's Offset Calculation Was an Abuse of Discretion.2 
The purpose of the offset called for by the Appeals Court in the event of non-
performance by the Trust was to complete the Trust's performance so that the parties could 
each get what they bargained for. Collard owed Nagle $85,000 in September, 1979. As the 
Trial Court determined, the shares of stock never reached a value where Nagle could realize 
$85,000 and Collard never tendered $85,000 despite Nagle's demand. Addendum, Ex. C, 
2
 Nagle is not challenging the factual findings made by the Trial Court; rather, he is 
challenging the legal conclusions derived from those findings. Thus, contrary to the Trust's 
repeated arguments, it is not necessary for Nagle to marshal the evidence in order to challenge 
the Trial Court's offset remedy. Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 
1014 (Utah 2002). 
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Findings of Fact at J 12, R. 2495; Conclusions of Law at J 11, R. 2506. Nagle declared 
Collard in default shortly after the one year period expired. Addendum, Ex. D, Trial Ex. 105, 
R. 2430 - 31. Thus, at the time of the breach, the Trust owed Nagle the sum certain of 
$85,000. 
By imposing performance duties on Nagle which are not in the contract, the Trial 
Court reduced the amount the Trust was required to pay as an offset to complete 
performance. As a result, the Trust is able to "complete" performance of the contract by 
paying less for the property than it originally agreed to pay. Moreover, Nagle offered 
unrefuted evidence at trial that the value of the property had increased to at least $380,000. 
R. 2619 at 346: 1 8 - 2 0 . The Trust had already sold the property to an affiliate for 
approximately $230,000 four years prior to trial. R. 2619 at 331: 2 - 7. The Trust therefore 
received a benefit from the sale of the property at an appreciated value which it kept for itself 
without compensating Nagle at any value. The Trial Court's decision to deny Nagle the full 
benefit of his bargain is not equitable if for no other reason that that the Trust is receiving the 
full benefit of its bargain even though it did not fully perform. 
The Trust argues that Nagle is not entitled to additional compensation including 
interest because he could have brought suit before 1987 but did not. The Trust does not 
explain why that fact is important. Upon Collard's default, Nagle simply kept title, as he was 
entitled to do under paragraph 16A of the Contract. The Trust has not provided any authority 
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to support the proposition that it was Nagle who should have brought suit upon breach. 
Indeed, such a proposition does not make sense. The transaction at issue is a land sale. 
Obviously, if there is a breach of the land sale contract, the vendor's first remedy is to retain 
title until the vendee performs. Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 423 P.2d 491,494 (Utah 1967) ("Until 
payment is made, or if terms are given by a contract, until compliance therewith so as 
to entitle the purchaser to the possession of the land, the purchaser would not be 
entitled to the possession ") (emphasis added). This is precisely what Nagle did. By 
imposing extra-contractual duties upon Nagle, by allowing the Trust to complete 
performance for an amount less than the parties agreed upon and without accounting for the 
fact that the Trust has already benefitted from the appreciation of the property, the Trial 
Court abused its discretion in the calculation of the offset. 
E. This Court Has The Power to Order The Property to be Made Available 
to Secure a Judgment 
The Trust claims that the issue of making the property available to satisfy a monetary 
judgment is not properly before this Court. This argument is mistaken for two reasons. First, 
Nagle did raise before the Trial Court the issue of the Court's ability to take control of the 
property as part of providing a remedy to Nagle. R. 2619 at 324: 21 - 25. 
Second, regardless of whether the issue was properly raised below, this Court has the 
inherent authority to fashion a remedy which makes the property available to satisfy a 
monetary judgment. Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338,340 (Utah 1980) (The Supreme Court 
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"is charged with the review of both facts and law in equity decisions, and may, where 
the occasion warrants, substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court and 
fashion its own remedy according to the demands of justice") (emphasis added). In this 
regard, it bears repeating that the property was conveyed to family members of the 
beneficiaries of the Trust. R. 2619 at 329: 9 - 331: 7. As such, even as the Trust claims the 
property has been conveyed to a third-party, the Trust beneficiaries continue to have access 
to the property and to enjoy its benefits. Therefore, it does not offend equity to ensure that 
Nagle is able to obtain satisfaction of a monetary judgment, should this Court rule in his 
favor on the merits. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT BOTH ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
PLAIN ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TRANSACTION INVOLVED 
105,000 SHARES OF STOCK. 
A. In Ruling That The Transaction Between Coilard And Nagle Involved 
105.000 Shares. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. 
1. The Trial Court's Ruling Violated The Mandate Rule of The Law 
of The Case Doctrine. 
For the reasons discussed supra at p. 11, the Trial Court abused its discretion by 
entertaining and ruling upon argument and evidence already in the record which, the Trust 
argued, showed that the transaction involved 105,000 shares. 
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2. The Trial Court's Ruling Violated The Statute of Frauds. 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract between the parties clearly stated that 55,000 
shares would be conveyed to Nagle and, if they reached a value where they could realize 
$85,000 during the one-year period, Nagle would convey title. Addendum, Ex. A, R. 2417. 
Notwithstanding this express contractual provision the Trial Court determined that "it is clear 
to the court that Collard owed $85,000 to Nagle and that to pay that amount more than 
55,000 shares would be required given the historical value of the Utah Coal shares." 
Addendum, Ex. C at Findings of Fact, f 6, R. 2491 (emphasis added). The Trial Court also 
determined. "Rather it is reasonable that Collard would transfer the additional 50,000 shares 
to Nagle and Nagle would simply reduce the $85,000 owing to the amount remaining 
depending on the value of those 50,000 shares." Addendum, Ex. C, Findings of Fact at f 6, 
R. 2492. 
These conclusions necessarily mean that the parties modified their agreement 
subsequent to Addendum 2. Indeed, the sequence of events described by the Trial Court 
could not have happened without some kind of modification agreed upon by the parties. This 
can be seen because the last writing between the parties indicated 55,000 shares would be 
conveyed but the next document, which the Trial Court appears to have relied on, the stock 
transfer record, Trial Ex. 14, states 105,000 shares were registered. There is no writing 
indicating the parties agreed to increase the amount of shares. Yet, the Statute of Frauds is 
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unequivocally clear that such modification must be in writing for purposes of this contract. 
U.C.A. § 25-5-3. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985). 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling Regarding 105.000 Shares Was Also Clearly 
Erroneous. 
The factual record does not support the Trial Court's factual determination that the 
transaction between the parties involved 105,000 shares. 
1. Nagle Properly Marshaled The Evidence. 
The Trust does not point to any evidence which Nagle failed to marshal as part of the 
argument that the Trial Court's finding was clearly erroneous and which would have served 
as the basis for the Trial Court's decision. Rather, the Trust argues over the meaning of the 
evidence marshaled. The Trust also takes another opportunity to argue against the obvious 
conclusion that the Trial Court implicitly determined that the parties had orally, and therefore 
impermissibly, modified their contract. 
2. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Support The Trial Court's 
Finding. 
It was the Trust's burden as plaintiff to prove that the transaction actually involved 
105,000 shares. Harris v. IES Associates. Inc., 69 P.3d 297. 310 (Utah App. 2003). The 
Trust did not carry this burden. In particular, it laid no foundation for the admissibility of 
Trial Ex. 14, the stock transfer record, as evidence that the parties agreed the transaction 
would involve 105,000 shares. Rather, the document merely indicated that 105,000 shares 
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were registered by the transfer agent on September 18, 1979. Beyond that, the Trial Court 
appears to have concluded that because Nagle could not prove that he did not buy the extra 
50,000 shares, they must have been part of the transaction. There is simply insufficient 
evidence to support this conclusion. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
The Trial Court concluded as a matter of fact and law that the Trust did not perform 
and that there was a failure of a condition of the contract. Addendum, Ex. C, Findings of 
Fact, ]f 12, R. 2495 - 97, Conclusions of Law, If 11, R. 2506. Accordingly, Nagle was owed 
at least $85,000. That amount was due and owing and demanded in January, 1981. 
Addendum, Ex. D, Trial Ex. 105, R. 2430 - 31. 
The $85,000 due and owing is a sum certain and the interest applied utilizing the then 
prevailing interest rate (8% per annum) allows the Court to determine an amount with 
mathematical certainty. That is all Utah law requires. L & A DrywalL Inc. v. Whitmore 
Const. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). 
The supposed uncertainty of the amount owed which the Trust points to support a 
denial of pre-judgment interest arises from the Trial Court's erroneous calculation of the 
offset, particularly the misreading of Nagle's obligations under the Contract. Once the Trial 
Court's abuses of discretion are remedied, it is clear that Nagle is owed an amount certain 
capable of being calculated with mathematical accuracy. Accordingly, if Nagle is not 
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entitled to recoup title to the property, he is entitled to an offset reflecting the $85,000 plus 
interest. 
V. THE APPEALS COURT HELD THAT ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE 
RECOVERABLE UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
The Trust erroneously contends that attorney's fees are to be awarded in equity and 
not in contract. Thus, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. Trust Brief 
at p. 48. This contention is contrary to the Appeals Court decision. The Appeals Court 
expressly held: 
We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment for [the Trust] and ordering title to be conveyed to [the 
Trust] upon payment of the mortgage. We also conclude that 
the only basis for awarding attorney's fees is the contract 
and leave to the Trial Court on remand to determine 
whether and to whom attorney's fees and costs should be 
awarded. 
Addendum, Ex. B at f 30, R. 2429 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Trial Court's determination of the issue of attorney's fees is entitled 
to no particular deference. Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah App. 1993). For the 
reasons set forth in Nagle's Opening Brief, Nagle is entitled to attorney's fees as the 
prevailing party and would be entitled to attorney's fees should he prevail on this appeal. 
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VI. THE TRUST'S CLAIMS OF BRIEFING INADEQUACIES ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
The Trust asks this Court to ignore almost all of Nagle's argument because of alleged 
briefing inadequacies. The Trust's claims are largely trivial. More importantly, they are an 
obvious attempt to distract this Court's attention away from the merits of Nagle's appeal and, 
the Trust seems to hope, to act as an inducement for this Court to avoid the thorny issues 
raised by this difficult case. These improper overtures should be summarily rejected and this 
Court should decide the case on its merits. 
A. Nagle Has Not Violated U.R.A.P. 24. 
The Trust's description of the alleged deficiencies in Nagle's Brief is simply wrong. 
Trust Brief at pp. 14 - 15. Moreover, to construct a brief in the fashion the Trust seems to 
suggest would lengthen and stultify the briefing process. This is directly contrary to the 
purposes of U.R.A.P. 24 as described in the cases cited by the Trust. See, e.g.. Christensen 
v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
Simply put, Nagle properly identified the appropriate standards of review not only in 
that specific section of his Brief but also in the body of the argument. Moreover, the 
preservation of the record citations do not require this Court "to searchf] the entire lower 
court record." Such exaggeration amply demonstrates the smallness of the Trust's argument. 
Finally, even if there are deficiencies in Nagle's Brief they do not come anywhere near 
to those which concerned the Appeals Court in the Christensen case nor do they come close 
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to those overlooked by the Appeals Court in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960,962 
(UtahApp. 1988).3 Nagle's Brief easily satisfies this Court's standards. Indeed, the Trust 
understood Nagle's Brief well enough to draft a 50 page response. This is a case which calls 
out for a determination on the merits. It should not be resolved on the basis on a strategically 
motivated use of hyper-technicalities. 
B. Nagle Properly Preserved Issues Before The Trial Court Where Possible. 
The Trust urges this Court to ignore important arguments favoring reversal of the 
Trial Court on the grounds that the arguments were not properly preserved at the Trial Court 
level. The Trust again is not correct. 
1. The Issue of The Statute of Frauds Could Not Be Preserved At 
Trial. 
The issue of modification did not emerge until the Trial Court explained its reasoning 
behind its ruling in its Memorandum Decision that the transaction involved 105,000 shares. 
Addendum, Ex. C, Findings of Fact, *| 6, R. 2490 - 91. The Trust, as it has acknowledged 
here, did not argue that the contract had been modified. Therefore, it was not possible to 
3
 There, in deciding to reach merits of case, the Appeals Court stated: 
We concede that not every brief filed is in strict compliance with our 
rules. Nor is every brief we see any more than every opinion we write, a 
masterpiece of legal writing. Ordinarily, however, the briefs do enable 
us to understand, with varying degrees of effort, what particular errors 
were allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, and 
why, under applicable authorities, those errors are material ones neces-
sitating reversal or other relief. 
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preserve the issue of modification at the Trial Court because it simply did not come up. It was 
not necessary for Nagle to file a post-judgment motion challenging the Trial Court's ruling 
in order to raise the issue before the Appeals Court. Sittner v. Schriever. 2 P.3d 442, 445 
(Utah 2000) (The general rule is that failure to raise an argument before the trial court 
precludes a party from raising that argument on appeal. "However, this rule does not 
require a party to file a post-judgment motion before the trial court as a prerequisite to 
filing an appeal") (emphasis added). Nagle did object to the introduction of evidence 
concerning the 105,000 shares on other grounds. See, e.g.. Nagle's Motion to Strike the 
Trust's Pretrial Order, R. 2378 - 79. 
2. The Issue of The Trust's Judicial Admissions Was Sufficiently 
Preserved at The Trial Court. 
In his Motion to Strike the Trust's Pretrial Order, Nagle stated: "In its November 6, 
2000 Order, which was drafted by the Trust, the Court referred at several junctures to the 
55,000 shares" (emphasis added). R. 2379. At trial, Nagle stated: "In every other pleading 
that the Trust has submitted, the Court's - Judge Bohling's Order, the Appeals Court Order, 
all make reference to 55,000." R. 2619 at 375: 8-10. Moreover, the Trust, through counsel, 
contemporaneously acknowledged that the transaction involved 55,000 shares. Addendum, 
Ex. E, Trial Ex. 108, R. 2477 - 78. 
It is true that the term "judicial admission" was not used. However, the elements of 
judicial admission are present and Nagle's objection to evidence regarding 105,000 shares 
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was such that the specific issue of judicial admissions was reasonably discernible from the 
pleadings, affidavits and exhibits offered. Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 
(Utah 1984); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987). Finally, the Trust has 
failed to respond to Nagle's argument that it should be estopped from arguing that the 
transaction involved more than 55,000 shares. Stevenson v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339, 352 
(Utah 1996). 
3. Nagle Properly Raised The Issue of Appreciation of The Property. 
The Trust contends that Nagle did not preserve for the record at the Trial Court the 
issue of the appreciation of the property. This is not accurate. At trial, Nagle introduced 
evidence, without objection, concerning the appreciated value of the property. R.2619 at 
346:18-20. Nagle also requested that if the Trial Court did not allow him to recoup title to the 
property, that he receive the value of the property. R. 2619 at 321: 17 - 322: 8; 385: 20 - 25. 
Nagle also raised the issue of the value of the property in his pre-trial order. R. 2408. 
Moreover, the Trust raised the issue of appreciation when attempting to demonstrate that it 
did not behave inequitably when it conveyed the property to an affiliate. R. 2619 at 335:2 -
10. 
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4. This Court May Consider These Matters Even if They Were Not 
Properly Preserved. 
Even if these matters were not properly preserved, this Court may still consider them. 
This is so because "an appellate court has inherent authority to consider issues which the 
parties have not raised if doing so is necessary to a proper decision." Kaiserman 
Associates. Inc. v. Francis Town. 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). 
In addition, this Court may consider the issues discussed in Nagle's Brief because the 
Trial Court made plain errors. Theses plain errors were described in Nagle's Opening Brief: 
Nagle's Opening Brief at pp. 3-9. To prevail under a plain error analysis, an error must have 
occurred, that error should have been apparent to the Trial Court, and the error must be 
harmful. Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465,470 (Utah App. 
1999). In each instance described above—the modification of the contract, the Trust's judicial 
admissions and the appreciation of the property - the Trial Court should have seen, even 
absent an objection from Nagle, that it was making an error in not recognizing the issues and 
their correct resolution. As such, Nagle is entitled to raise these issues on appeal. Classic 
Cabinets. 978 P.2d at 470. 
VII. NAGLE'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS 
An appeal is frivolous when it has no reasonable or legal or factual basis. Barton v. 
Barton. 29 P.3d 13, 19 (Utah App. 2001). The length of the Trust's Brief and the efforts it 
makes to substantively rebut Nagle's legal arguments are the clearest indications that, 
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regardless of whether Nagle prevails, he has submitted an appeal that has a legal and factual 
basis. Accordingly, the Trust is not entitled to sanctions under U.R.A.P. 33 or costs under 
U.R.A.P. 34. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been amply demonstrated, the Trial Court made numerous material errors in 
rendering its judgment in this case. These errors, standing alone and taken together, warrant 
a complete reversal of the Trial Court's judgment. Nagle respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Trial Court's August 15, 2005 judgment and award title to the property to Nagle 
along with attorney's fees and all other costs and fees incurred in this action, including the 
costs of this appeal. Alternatively, if this Court determines that Nagle is not entitled to recoup 
title to the property but is only entitled to a monetary remedy, Nagle respectfully requests that 
he be awarded the full $85,000 due and owing plus interest, including pre-judgment interest, 
secured by the property, along with the other relief previously requested. Either of these 
results will ensure the parties both provide and receive what they bargained for. In this way 
will equity truly be accomplished. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IS day of March, 2006 
By J/^K jl 
Sean N. Egan 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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